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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND
THE MAKING OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW ROLES FOR
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
INDIVIDUALS
KENNETH

S. GALLANT*

ABSTRACT

Judicial decisions of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
and other international criminal tribunals now serve as instances
of practice and statements of opinio juris for the formation of
customary international criminal law and customary international
human rights law related to criminal law and procedure. In these
areas of law and others, they are no longer "subsidiary" sources as
that word is used in Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).' In the same fields of customary
international law, other binding acts of international
organizations, such as the United Nations Security Council
("Security Council"), are also used as practice, and the statements
of these organizations are used as opinio juris.
Where judicial and quasi-judicial decisions of international
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This Article is a revised version of a presentation given on Panel III,
The Impact of the ICC, at the Belle R. and Joseph H. Braun Memorial Lecture
Series symposium, International Justice in the 21st Century: The Law and
Politics of the International Criminal Court, at the John Marshall Law School,
April 23, 2010. This Article was written with the assistance of a grant from
the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law.
1. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1153 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (stating: "The Court,
whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes
as are submitted to it, shall apply:... subject to the provisions of Article 59,
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.").

603

604

The John Marshall Law Review

[43:603

organizations are acts of treaty interpretation and application,
these acts are instances of subsequent practice. In some cases,
judicial decisions play a role similar to the subsequent acts of
states that are parties to the treaties in the Vienna Convention of
the Law of Treaties. Under the Rome Statute, when the ICC is
interpreting a matter within its judicial competence, its decision is
authoritative.
Individuals, particularly those accused of crime, can make
direct claims of right under international law to these courts and
tribunals. These claims may concern jurisdiction, the substantive
law of crimes and defenses, international human rights in criminal
procedure and criminal law, or other issues that arise in the
course of prosecutions.
The ICC and other international criminal tribunals are
expanding the role of international organizations, including the
international judiciary, in the process of making international law.
The role of international courts is now growing in other areas of
the law, such as international trade law. This growth is likely to
continue.
Individuals have gained the right to make claims directly
under international law in certain non-criminal international fora.
As in criminal law, the right depends on the agreement of states or
international organizations to establish these tribunals. While the
growth of this right is uncertain, it is hard to imagine that it will
be cut back.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Symposium has been focusing in depth on the history,
law, practice, and politics of the ICC. This Article steps back and
looks at the following questions:
1. How have the creation and operations of the ICC and other
international criminal tribunals reflected and contributed to
changes in the way public international law is made?
2. Do these changes reflect and contribute to growth in the
international legal personality of individuals?
3. How might the trends discussed here develop in the future of
international law generally?
There is no better place to begin this discussion than the
comments that Professor Roger S. Clark made in the discussion at
the end of the second panel at the Symposium. Professor Clark
pointed out the following: at Nuremberg, and in every
international criminal court and tribunal since, the accused have
raised substantive law defenses to the crimes charged. 2 In each of
2. Roger S. Clark, Bd. of Governors Professor, Rutgers School of Law,
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the courts and tribunals, some or all of the defenses raised have
come from sources outside the text of the organic documents of the
relevant court or tribunal. Yet each of these courts and tribunals
have responded to these claims concerning defenses on their
merits. They acted as though the accused had an enforceable right
to raise the defenses, and as though the courts or tribunals had a
legal duty to address the defenses. In the course of addressing
these claims, the courts and tribunals developed the substantive
international criminal law of defenses to crime. Professor Clark
indicated a view that this process would apply to defenses to the
crime of aggression, which the ICC Review Conference defined on
June 11, 2010, in Kampala, Uganda (after this Symposium was
held).3
Professor Clark's description is undoubtedly accurate. Indeed,
it does not only describe the process by which defenses to
international crime are developed, but also the process by which
the definitions of these crimes are developed 4 and how criminal
procedure and human rights protections are implemented. It also
stresses the right of individuals to make international law claims
in these tribunals and to receive a response to these claims based
in law.
This Article will elaborate issues raised for the making of
international law generally by these developments in international
criminal law as developed by international criminal courts or
tribunals, which are either international organizations
themselves5 or organs of international organizations.6 It will look
Panel Discussion at The

John Marshall

Law Review

Symposium:

International Justice in the 21st Century: The Law & Politics of the
International Criminal Court (Apr. 23, 2010). This paragraph is a paraphrase
of Professor Clark's comments and does not pretend to capture them exactly.
3. ICC Review Conference, Res. 6, Annexes I & II, ICC Doc. No. RC/Res.6
(June 11, 2010), adding ICC Statute, art. 8 bis (2) and ICC Elements of
Crimes, Crime of Aggression. See also id. Annex III, Understandings 6 & 7.
The Review Conference attached a complex set of conditions to the coming into
effect of this provision as to any given state. Id. Annex I, adding ICC Statute,
arts. 15 bis & 15 ter, and Annex III, Understandings 1-3.
4. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, T 220
(July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadic Judgment] (holding that participating in a
"joint criminal enterprise" is a mode of becoming responsible for an
internationally criminal act); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A,
Judgment and Sentence, IT 220-229 (Jan. 27, 2000) (defining rape as a crime
against humanity and as including any forcible sexual penetration, not simply
forcible vaginal intercourse, as in some national systems where other
penetrations are defined as other forms of sexual assault). From this point on,
much of the documentation in this Article will be illustrative rather than
comprehensive.
5. For example, International Criminal Court (ICC), Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL).
6. For example, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), both
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through the lens of the so-called Doctrine of Sources of
international law. It will argue that our understanding of the most
famous statement of that doctrine, Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice,7 is in need of revision. Also in need
of revision is the most famous statement of international custom
as a source of law: Manley 0. Hudson's definition for the
International Law Commission.8 In particular, the formation and
operation of international criminal courts and tribunals
demonstrates this need for revision.
that international
recognize
should
revision
The
to the formation of
contribute
organizations, as well as states,
customary international law through their practice and their
statements that evince opinio juris. In particular, the decisions of
international criminal courts and tribunals have taken their place
as such acts and statements of opinio juris.
The developments discussed here are real and need to be
taken into account, regardless of the view one has of the making of
international law. Thus, the material here needs to be considered
even by those who reject the usefulness of characterizing "sources"
and "evidence" of international law;9 though these persons may not
agree with the theoretical formulation stated here.
International criminal law, as administered by international
criminal courts and tribunals, is a particularly useful area for
considering changes to how international law is made. First, it is
public law: an international public authority prosecutes. The goals
of the law are to hold wrongdoers publicly accountable for great
wrongs to the public and to deter this behavior across
international boundaries. Second, it is international law: the
substantive law of the core international crimes is not simply the
law of individual states. It is the law of the international
community, expressed both in multilateral treaties and customary
established as subsidiary UN organs by the Security Council.
7. ICJ Statute, supra note 1, art. 38(a).
8. Manley 0. Hudson, [Working Paper on] Article 24 of the Statute of the
InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/16, T 11 (Mar. 3, 1950).
[T]he emergence of a principle or rule of customary international law
would seem to require presence of the following elements:
(a) concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of
situation falling within the domain of international relations;
(b) continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period

of time;
(c) conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with,
prevailing international law; and
(d) general acquiescence in the practice by other States.
Id.
9. See, e.g., ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 264-68 (Cornell Univ. Press 1971) (rejecting the notion of
the usefulness of characterizing sources of international law). Many others
find the Doctrine of Sources problematic for many reasons.
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international law. Finally, it is "hard law": convicting persons of
crime in these tribunals sends them to prison. A ruling for the
defense has similar, real consequences as to actual rights and
duties of persons.10
II.

How HAVE THE CREATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE ICC
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
REFLECTED AND CONTRIBUTED TO CHANGES IN THE WAY
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW Is MADE?
A.

Customaiy InternationalLaw

Operative acts and opinio juris of international organizations
must now be included among those acts and opinions that are
taken into account in the creation of customary international
law.11 In particular, those international organizations or organs of
international organizations that are international criminal courts
and tribunals contribute to the formation of customary
international law, at least and to the extent that their acts
perform the operative functions of issuing judgments and orders in
criminal cases.12 To the extent that their acts consist of the
10. This Article will limit itself to consideration of these operative "hard
law" acts. It will not enter into the debate concerning the legal effect of
declarations of law such as UN General Assembly Resolutions, often seen as
"softer" law.
11. "Operative" as a word to describe those acts that have legal
consequences or that create binding rules beyond the mere internal workings
of an organization is from INGRID DETTER, LAW MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS (P.A. Norstedt & Sonners F6rlag 1965). The proposition that
international organizations are actors making international law has been
around for some time, and various formulations of their authority have been
set forth. See, e.g., Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Enactment of Laws by
International Organizations,41 BRIT.Y.B. INT'L L. 198, 245 (1965-66) ( "the
law making acts of international organizations are a distinct source of the law
of nations"); Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Law-Making by International
Organizations, 19 THESAURUS ACROASIUM 357, 365 (1992) ("a fourth (and
new) category of rules of international law[,] . . . distinct from customary rules,
treaty rules and general principles of law. . ."); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, LAWMAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 57-122
(Syracuse Univ. Press 1969) (the seminal intensive study of lawmaking in a
single international organization); C. Economides, Les Acts Institutionnels
Internationauxet les Sources du Droit International,34 ANNUAIRE FRANQAIS
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 131 (1988); G.I. Tunkin, THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 203 (William E. Butler trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1974) (originally published in Russian, 1970); BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R.
TRIMBLE,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

147-48

(Aspen Publishers 3d ed.

1999)

[hereinafter CARTER & TRIMBLE]. A recent magisterial work on the subject is
JoSe E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 485-502

(Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
12. Cf. ALVAREZ, supra note 11, at 500-02. The other sources in note 11
generally did not deal with the acts of international criminal courts and
tribunals in the making of international law, largely because they were
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issuance of opinions connected to the judgments and orders, they
are expressing opiniojurs.
Some of the acts of the United Nations (UN) involved in
establishing international criminal tribunals have contributed as
practice to the creation of customary international law and/or
general principles of law, and they have evinced opinio juris as
well.13 The treatment of legality (particularly the non-retroactivity
of crimes and punishments) in the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is striking.14 In his
report suggesting the creation of the ICTY, the Secretary-General
of the UN stated:
In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the principle
nullum crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal
should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are
beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the problem of
adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions does not
arise. This would appear to be particularly important in the context
of an international tribunal prosecuting persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law.' 5
By itself, this states the opinio juris of the Secretariat as an
organ of the UN.
Then, in the resolution establishing the ICTY, the Security
Council accepted the entire text of the ICTY Statute proposed by
the Secretary-General, including the definitions of crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.16 That resolution explicitly
"[aipproves" the Report of the Secretary General.17 The resolution
implements the principle of legality by specification of crimes in
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It evinces the opinio of the
Security Council, in adopting that of the Secretariat. The Security
Council structured the ICTY's jurisdiction in the way the
Secretary-General had suggested in order to apply the principle of
written before the rise of the modern international criminal tribunals, while
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were not considered international
organizations in the modern sense. The claims throughout this Article that the

"hard law" acts of international organizations are practice and opinio juris for
purposes of the formation of customary international law are, as will be seen,
analytically somewhat different and slightly more modest than the broadest
claims in the pieces by Skubiszewski, supra note 11. This Article does not
address an older debate: the place of formally non-binding resolutions of
international organizations, such as UN General Assembly, in the formation of
customary international law.
13. KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL

AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 347-51 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
14. Id. at 305-08.

15. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808, 1 34, U.N. Doc. No. S/25704
(May 3, 1993) [hereinafter Sec.-Gen. Report].
16. S. C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. No. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
17. Id. V 1.
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legality. That is, though it did not include the principle of legality
in the explicit text of the ICTY Statute, the statement about
nullum crimen sine lege in the approved Report is the opinio of the
Security Council as well as the Secretariat. According to the
Secretary-General's Report as a whole (approved by the Security
Council), international human rights law of crime and criminal
procedure should generally apply in an international criminal
tribunal.
Judgments and other decisions of international criminal
courts and tribunals are practice of those entities as international
organizations with a judicial function. They are operative acts that
result ultimately in imprisonment (and imposition of other
penalties such as fines or restitution) on those convicted of
international crime, or in absolution for those found innocent.
Under the rule of ne bis in idem, either convictions or acquittals
prohibit states from prosecuting again for the same acts. 18
Decisions other than final judgments may also be acts finally
adjudicating rights and responsibilities under international law.
One example is where these courts decide that they have
jurisdiction to proceed in cases, and particularly where they decide
on the legality of their creation. 19 Beyond operative effects in a
given matter, the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) have recognized and followed their own and
each other's prior decisions on a variety of matters. 20

18. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 20, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 10, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda art. 9, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute].
19. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic Juris.
Appeal].
leng Thirith, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38),
Decision on the Appeals against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint
Criminal Enterprise, 1 53ff (May 20, 2010) [hereinafter Cambodia Decisionon
Joint Criminal Enterprise].
20. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. 95-1-A, Judgment
161, n.241 (June 1, 2001) (noting that mens rea doctrine of
(Reasons),
general criminal intent "must not be confused with motive and that, in respect
of genocide, personal motive does not exclude criminal responsibility providing
that the acts . . . were committed 'with intent to destroy, in whole or in part a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group."'), relying on Tadic Judgment,
supra note 4, 269 (distinguishing between motive for crime and mens rea);
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgment, IT 10709 (Mar. 24, 2000) (stating general rule of following its own prior practice
absent "cogent reasons in the interests of justice.") [hereinafter Aleksovski].
See also L. Zegfeld, The Bouterse Case, 32 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 97, 99-100
(2001); GALLANT, supra note 13, at 349.
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One wonderful thing about court judgments as practice is
that, in the system of international criminal law, they come with
opinions stating reasons that the judgment is compelled by the
facts and law. Thus, they generally come with opinio jurisbuilt in.
One need not struggle to determine whether a judgment or other
decision was given because of a belief in the compulsion of a
certain rule of law or not: the parties are entitled to a statement of
the reasons for the decision. 2 1
In its first major decision, the Tadic Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction("Tadic Appeal'), the ICTY Appeals Chamber gave lip

service to the idea that it would "ascertain State practice" in
determining the laws and customs of war. 22 But in that case it
demonstrated that it was really determining "international
practice," whether of states or other relevant entities. 23 And now ,
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have said
that judicial decisions are "subsidiary," 24 but then went on, in fact,
to give international criminal court and tribunal decisions at least
as much weight as instances of national practice. 25
The ICTY Appeals Chamber treated resolutions of the
Security Council (other than the acts establishing the Tribunals)
as practice of an international organization going to the
establishment of custom. 26 It acted similarly with regard to actions
of the European Union (and its predecessor, the European
Community), though it appeared to treat those actions as both
actions of an international organization and its member states. 27
In the same case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber also treated two
Security Council resolutions on matters unrelated to the Former
Yugoslavia as providing opinio juris as to individual criminal
responsibility. 28
The ICTY Appeals Chamber later used the Report of the
Secretary-General in a different context. When the ICTY discussed
the right of appeal, it used statements in the Secretary-General's
21. See Rome Statute, supra note 18, arts. 74(5) (requiring "full and
reasoned statement" of Trial Chamber decision), 83(4) (Appeals Chamber
"judgement shall state the reasons on which it is based.").
22. Tadic Juris.Appeal, supra note 19, 99.
23. Id. 109 ("The practical results the ICRC has thus achieved in inducing
compliance with international humanitarian law ought therefore to be
regarded as an element of actual international practice.").
24. Cambodia Decision on Joint Criminal Enterprise,supra note 19, T 53,
citing ICJ Statute, supra note 1, art. 38(1)(d).
25. Id. I 54ff.
114, 116.
26. Tadic Juris.Appeal, supra note 19,
27. Id. 1 113, 115-16.
28. See id. 133 (calling the Security Council on Somalia Resolutions 794
and 814 "[o]f great relevance to the formation of opinio juris to the effect that
violations of general international humanitarian law governing internal
armed conflicts entail the criminal responsibility of those committing or
ordering those violations . . . .").
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Report as part of the opinio demonstrating the content of the
customary international human rights law right of individuals to a
fair trial in criminal cases. 29
Beyond states and international organizations, there are two
other entities whose practice the ICTY Appeals Chamber treated
as partly constitutive of customary international law of armed
conflict. The first is the very important practice (not just
statements of opinio) of the International Committee of the Red
Cross, 30 which in the tradition has been treated as sui generis, a
in
status
special
with
organization
non-governmental
international law, particularly international humanitarian law.
The second is perhaps more controversial: practice of insurgent
groups. 31
Additionally, from the very beginning, the ICTY has treated
international and national judicial decisions as part of the practice
used to determine the laws and customs of war, without referring
to any "subsidiarity" of these acts. Indeed, it has given reasons
why judicial decisions must be some of the acts relied upon,
notably the fact that they are so much easier to find and
understand than acts of soldiers in combat in the field.32 In the
rather special case of the construction of contempt of court as a
crime, it treated both national practice (legislative and judicial)
and international practice as constitutive of a general principle of
law (though not customary international law), which allowed
international criminal tribunals to exercise essentially inherent
authority to punish for contempt. 33
The discussion of cases above could be expanded many times
over. By itself, it does not show much more than what is
commonly known: international criminal courts and tribunals
make these declarations of law and use them to justify their
judgments against, and sometimes in favor of, persons accused of
international crime. 34
98, 100, 104.
29. Aleksovski, supra note 20,
30. Id. 109.
31. Id. IT 107-08. The ICRC says the legal significance of practice of armed
opposition groups is "unclear." 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE
DOSWALD-BECK, eds., CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW xxxvi
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (study for the International Committee of the
Red Cross) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY IHL].
32. Tadic Juris. Appeal, supra note 19, J 99, 106 (Nigerian military
125 (Nigerian Supreme
tribunal decisions followed by executions); cf. id.
Court decision discussed as "State practice"), 128 (citing Nuremberg Tribunal).
33. Prosecutor v. Tadic (Appeal of Vujin), Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77,
Judgment on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, T
13-29 (Feb. 27, 2001), discussed in GALLANT, supra note 13, at 309-11.
34. See, e.g., ALVAREZ, supra note 11, at 500-02 (discussing international
organizations and customary international law more generally). A large
number of specialized international criminal law and international
humanitarian law articles discuss the law as declared in international
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Importantly, these cases are used as points of practice for
future determinations. The value of a judicial act as norm-creating
(lawmaking) is determined by whether it is followed or not. In
international law, this includes whether the judicial act is followed
by courts in the future or by relevant practice of states and
international organizations.
These examples of practice and statements of opinion have
become as important (as "primary") for the determination and
development of customary international law as a given example of
practice or statement of opinion by a state, if not more so in most
cases. The ICJ may not be able to admit this in its own practice
because its statute treats judicial decisions as "subsidiary" sources
of international law,35 and its own decisions are said to have "no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of [the]
particular case [before the ICJ]."36 However, these aspects of the
ICJ Statute bind neither states nor international organizations
(other than the UN when it acts through the ICJ as its judicial

organ) in their consideration of what constitutes customary
international law.
A few commentators attempt to maintain the hierarchy of
sources proposed in the ICJ Statute and maintain the "subsidiary"
nature of judicial decisions even in international criminal law
cases. 37 This ignores real practice of the courts outside the ICJ,
which have broken the thrall of Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute.
The ICC in fact treats the cases of the prior international
criminal tribunals and the European Court of Human Rights, as
well as its own decisions, as practice in its determination of
customary international law, whether substantive criminal law or
human rights law. For example, in confirming charges against
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Pre-Trial Chamber determined that
recruitment of child soldiers was a crime at the time that Dyilo
was alleged to have done so. As part of this determination, it used
as practice the decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) that this prohibition was a "customary law norm" prior to
November 1996.38 Similarly, in dealing with claims under
customary international human rights law that an illegal arrest of
criminal courts and tribunals.
35. ICJ Statute, supra note 1, art. 38.
36. Id. art. 59.
37. See, e.g., L.J. VAN DEN HERIK, THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE RWANDA
TRIBUNAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 274-75 (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 2005) (tribunal decisions are subsidiary sources of
international law).
38. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges,
311, n.400 (Pre-Tr. Ch, Jan. 29, 2007),
using Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-A R72(E), Decision on
17Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment),
24 (May 31, 2004) [hereinafter Norman].
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an accused in the Congo should vitiate the jurisdiction of the ICC,
the Pre-Trial Chamber used decisions of the ICTR, the ICTY, and
the European Court of Human Rights as practice in determining
that there was no customary international law requirement that
prohibited the exercise of jurisdiction in that case. 39
There is one extremely important indication of state
acceptance of this practice: more than 113 states have adopted the
Rome Statute, including Article 21(2), which states that "[t]he
Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its
previous decisions." 40 This text is not limited to interpreting the
Rome Statute itself, but also applies to all relevant rules of law,
which may include "applicable treaties and the principles and
rules of international law . . ." and "general principles of law

derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the
world . . . ."41 Interestingly, this rule of using prior decisions does
not appear in the early versions of the Rome Statute, such as the
1994 International Law Commission draft, 42 and thus the rule
does not appear before the ICTY and ICTR began to operate. It
first appears in the official travaux preparatoires of the Rome
Statute in 1996, as one of many state proposals. 43 This was after it
became clear that the ICTY, at any rate, would use both its own
decisionS44 and that of the prior Nuremberg Tribunal45 as practice.
The Rome Statute was adopted in 1998, and states subsequently
ratified it in light of this practice. As far as can be determined,
those states failing to ratify the Rome Statute do not generally
complain about this provision of the Statute.
A judgment of an international criminal court or tribunal.is at
least a point of practice on the substance of relevant customary
international law for subsequent cases, even when the same court
is not involved. The pattern stated in Article 59 of the ICJ Statute
that its decision "has no binding force except between the parties
39. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-512, Decision
on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article
19(2)(a) of the Statute, nn.30-33 and accompanying text (Oct. 3, 2006)
[hereinafter Lubanga Dyilo].
40. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 21(2).
41. Id. art. 21(1)(b),(c).
42. See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the work of its fortysixth session [ILC Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court], U.N.
Doc. A/49/10 (May 2-June 22, 1994) (silent as to a rule regarding the use of
prior decisions as authority). The official preparatory documents (travaux
preparatoiresin international law jargon) for the Rome Statute used here are
collected in 2 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: AN ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE EVOLUTION OF
THE STATUTE (Transnational Publishers 2005).
43. U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Vol. II, U.N. Doc. A/51/22, 107 (1996).
44. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-R61, Review of
Indictment, 26 (Oct. 20, 1995).
45. See, e.g., id.; Tadic Juris.Appeal, supra note 19, 128.
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and in respect of the particular case"46 has been decisively rejected
as a rule to be used by international criminal courts and
tribunals-at least if "no binding force" is taken broadly to mean
no consideration at all as practice.
These changes do not mean that international criminal courts
and tribunals are exactly like common law courts in a national
system. The Appeals Chamber of the ICC is not a Supreme
Criminal Court for the world, and its judgments are not binding
precedent for all nations, international organizations, courts, and
individuals everywhere.
When dealing with judgments of other courts, an
international or internationalized criminal tribunal may consider
the decision of another international tribunal simply to be one
instance of practice, and one statement of opinio among many, and
may conclude that other practice requires that a case not be
followed. Thus, the ICTY considered the definition of "control" over
insurgent forces by a foreign government set out by the ICJ in the
Nicaraguacase, but the ICTY ultimately followed a different rule
for purposes of defining "control" in war crimes cases. 47 And the
Pre-Trial Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia decided that practice as of the time of the Cambodian
crimes against humanity, from 1975 through 1979, did not support
one type (out of three) of "joint criminal enterprise" liability set out
by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Judgment opinion.48
The Cambodian Chamber correctly distinguished between the
ICTY's Tadic Judgment case as an instance of practice for purpose
of the formation of customary international law of "joint criminal
enterprise" and the ICC's Lubanga Dyilo case, which formulated a
different theory of criminal responsibility of individuals because of
its reading of the text of the Rome Statute-that is, the ICC's
binding organic document. 49 Both these cases, however, were
decided long after the accused in Cambodia had committed their
acts and could not count as practice that had relevance to whether
so called "extended" joint criminal enterprise liability existed at
the time of their acts.50
In one important way, however, the practice of international
46. ICJ Statute, supra note 1, art. 59 (following Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, art. 59 (Dec. 16, 1920)).
47. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4,
99ff (considering and ultimately
rejecting the rule of control stated in Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)).
48. Cambodia Decisionon Joint CriminalEnterprise,supra note 19, 36ff.
49. Id. 1 51, n.136 (referring to the different "control over the crime
approach" of the ICC under its Statute, as discussed in Lubanga Dyilo, supra
note 39), TT 326ff, 54ff (discussing joint criminal enterprise as a customary
international law approach in Tadic Judgment, supranote 4).
50. It would not serve the purpose of this Article to go into the details of
"extended" joint criminal enterprise liability.
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criminal tribunals approaches a common law idea of precedent.
The Appeals Chamber rulings of the ad hoc Tribunals on points of
law bind their Trial Chambers in the way familiar to the common
law world.5 1 In the Aleksovski case announcing the rule that
"absent cogent reasons" the ICTY should follow its own Appeals
Chamber case law, the ICTY Appeals Chamber effectively held
that its own later case law was to be followed by Trial Chambers
in preference to an earlier ruling of the ICJ on a similar issue in a
non-criminal case. 52 It did not rely on Article 59 of the ICJ Statute,
which denies effect to an ICJ judgment except between the parties
in respect of a particular case. As Professor William A. Schabas,
another of the Symposium speakers, said in a different context:
The ad hoc Tribunals "treat the rulings of their own Appeals
Chambers as authoritative, and not merely 'subsidiary'. . . . [I]t is

now well accepted that the Trial Chambers are bound by the ratio
decidendi of rulings of the Appeals Chamber." 53 And, for example,
a person acting within the territory of the Former Yugoslavia
during the existence of the ICTY might expect that the rulings of
the Appeals Chamber might be applied to his or her future acts.
It remains to be seen whether the ICC will implement this
rule and require both its Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers to follow
decisions of law made by its Appeals Chamber in prior cases.
Given the developments discussed here, and the "implicit"54 nature
of Appeals Chambers in courts that are structured with some
hierarchy, it is reasonable to think that the ICC will act in this
way, and that it ought to do so.
In any event, international criminal courts and tribunals are
not the sole makers of this law. The notion of state practice as
largely constitutive of customary international criminal law
remains. The ICC and other international criminal tribunals
frequently refer to state acts as part of the construction of
customary international law. 5 5 The ICTY and SCSL, which were
created mostly to avoid impunity for acts already committed, insist
on the existence of a crime at the time the allegedly criminal act
was committed, as does the ICC.5 6 This implies that they also
reject the idea that the Security Council, as an organ of an
international organization, can create binding international
112-13 (Trial Chambers bound by Appeals
51. Aleksovski, supra note 20,
Chamber ruling).
52. Id.
95, citing as practice on treaty interpretation, Cossey v. United
Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
53. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS:
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 107 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2006).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Tadic Judgment, supra note 4.
56. See, e.g., id.; LubangaDyilo,supra note 39, 1 311, n.400, using Norman,
supra note 38, IT 17-24.
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criminal law if that law is to be applied retroactively. They apply
international human rights law in their decisions, whether or not
such law is explicitly stated in their statutes. 5 7
B. Treaty Interpretation
Similarly, these acts and opinions of international criminal
courts and tribunals contribute as subsequent practice for the
interpretation of relevant treaty law. This is true even in some
cases where the international organization is not a party to the
treaty being interpreted. This expands the traditional rule, as
stated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that
subsequent practice in the application of a treaty shall be taken
into account if it "establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation . . . ."58
In some cases, judicial decisions may be more that just
"subsequent practice" for the purpose of treaty interpretationespecially when decisions are made on a treaty that is the organic
document of the court. The ICC itself interprets and applies the
Rome Statute as to all of its judicial functions. Article 119 of its
statute states: "Any dispute concerning the judicial functions of
the Court shall be settled by the decision of the Court."59 This,
combined with the provision allowing use of "principles and rules
of law as interpreted in its previous decisions,"6 0 makes the
decisions of the ICC, especially its Appeals Chamber, effectively
authoritative as to these matters.
These cases will generally arise on the basis of claims made
by or against individuals as persons being investigated or
prosecuted. In some cases, they may be brought by persons who
are victims of crimes. Finally, they may be brought by states
challenging determinations of jurisdiction and admissibility6 1 or
requirements to cooperate with the Court. 62 Thus, it is likely to be
57. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 21(3) (stating law of Rome
Statute must be applied and interpreted to be "consistent with internationally
recognized human rights..."), and Cambodia Decision on Joint Criminal
Enterprise, supra note 19, 1 43 (applying principle of legality as an
internationally recognized human right), with Aleksovski, supra note 20, 1
126, and Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. 95-14/2-PT, Decision on the Joint
Defence Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Portions of the Amended
Indictment alleging "Failure to Punish" Liability, 1 20 (Mar. 2, 1999) (both
applying non-retroactivity of customary international law crimes, even though
such a rule was not in the ICTY Statute, and both discussed in SCHABAS,
supra note 53, at 84).
58. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969,
(emphasis added).
59. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 119(1).
60. Id. art. 21(2).
61. Id. arts. 17-19.
62. Id. Part IX. The relationship between a state not party to the Rome
Statute and the ICC itself following a Security Council referral of a situation
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a distinct minority of interpretations of the Statute in the Court
where the issue of interpretation will be raised by states, the
normal entities for raising issues of treaty interpretation in the
international system. In other cases, it is likely that states may be
able to participate only as amici curiae.
States effectively have little appeal to the Assembly of States
Parties (ASP) on matters of interpretation. The ASP cannot
interfere in the judgments and decisions made in a case. The ASP
can propose amendments to the Statute, which must be
subsequently ratified. 63 The Assembly of States Parties does have
authority to amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the
Elements of Crime, or to reject changes the Judges propose to the
Regulations of the Court. 64 These are lawmaking tasks to be
carried out within the framework of the Statute, and to some
degree involve interpreting the Statute.6 5
The Rome Statute as a treaty gives to another international
organ, the ICJ, the "principal" judicial organ of the UN, the
authority to settle disputes among the parties to the treaty about
its interpretation that cannot be otherwise settled. Note that
under the ICJ Statute, only disputes among states can be brought
as contentious cases. Thus, to deal with any "non-judicial" dispute
between the ICC and a state, the ICJ would have to be asked
properly to exercise its advisory opinion jurisdiction. Such conflict
resolutions (or failures to resolve), whether reached among the
parties or decided by the ICJ, would appear to have the force of
similar practice among parties to a treaty. In these matters,
therefore, interpretation of the Rome Statute as a treaty much
more resembles the traditional model of claim and counterclaim
among states and international organizations. The one difference
is that the subsequent practice might involve practice of the
international organization in dealing with states, as well as states
who are parties to a treaty dealing among themselves.66
The Tribunals must regularly apply law of treaties other than
their own statutes, especially the great treaties of international
humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, their
Additional Protocols, and the earlier Hague Conventions. 67
in that state is peculiar. See Kenneth S. Gallant, The InternationalCriminal
Court in the System of States and International Organizations, 16 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 553 (2003) (emphasizing the peculiarity of such a situation).
63. Rome Statute, supra note 18, arts. 112, 119.
64. Id. arts. 9, 51, 52.
65. For example, the Elements of Crimes state interpretations of what facts
are required to prove each statutory crime.
66. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and
International Organizations or between International Organizations, March
20, 1986 (not yet in effect) (dealing with acts involving states and
international organizations).
67. SCHABAS, supra note 53, at 91-96.
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However, the context of the applications varies a great deal. At
Nuremberg, the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva
Convention of 1929 were applied as constitutive of the customary
international law of war crimes during the time of World War II.68
This type of application has continued through the modern ad hoc
tribunals, as where the ICTY Statute draws its provisions on the
"laws and customs of war" from the Hague Conventions of 1907 (as
discussed in the Secretary-General's report), without referring in
its text to Hague itself.6 9 In the Tadic Appeal case, the ICTY
followed the Nuremberg technique in the application of Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the ground that
Common Article 3 stated customary international law of war
crimes in non-international conflicts. 70 What the ICTY did was
develop a definition of customary international criminal law from
the treaty text (and the international community's acceptance of it
as custom). But in deciding whether specific acts violate Common
Article 3, the ICTY was necessarily interpreting the Geneva
Conventions, even if it was not applying them of their own force.7 1
The ICTY also interprets and applies the Geneva Conventions
directly. "Grave breaches" of those conventions are to be
criminalized by states under the conventions. They are crimes
under the ICTY Statute, by reference to the Geneva Conventions
themselves. 72
In the ICTR Statute, both Common Article 3 and Additional
Protocol II of 1977 (ratified and implemented by Rwanda before
the 1994 mass violence) were stated directly as the sources of
criminal law, without a claim that they stated customary
international law.73 In discussing the use of these documents as
sources of criminal law, the ICTR Trial Chamber depended both
upon Rwanda's status as a party to these treaties and had largely
implemented their provisions into domestic criminal law and upon
the status of the treaties as stating customary international law.74
Naturally, once these provisions were made part of the ICTR
68. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, 1 INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 171, 253-54 (Oct.

1, 1946) (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947).
69. ICTY Statute, supra note 18, art. 3; commented upon in Sec.-Gen.
Report, supranote 15, $T 41-44 (discussing the Hague Convention IV of 1907).

70. Geneva Conventions I-IV art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
87-89.
U.N.T.S. 135; Tadic Juris.Appeal, supra note 19,
71. ICTY Statute, supra note 18, art. 2; Tadic Juris. Appeal, supra note 19,
67ff.
72. ICTY Statute, supra note 18, art. 2.
73. Id. art. 4.
74. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 617 (Sept.
2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu] (relying on the ratification of Additional
Protocol II by Rwanda on Nov. 19, 1984, and the adoption of its provisions into
domestic criminal law, as well as the status of those provisions as customary
international law).

2010]

New Roles for InternationalOrganizationsand Individuals

619

Statute, the ICTR became responsible for appropriate
interpretations of these Statutes.
The Tadic Appeal opinion has been a vital piece of practice
and statement of opinio juris showing that serious violations of
Common Article 3 are customary international law crimes. Both
the Tadic Appeal opinion and the ICTR Statute were important in
the development of the idea that the "grave breaches" regime was
not the only rule of criminalization available under the Geneva
Conventions. Thus, the jurisprudence contributes to the
interpretation of these treaties as well as to customary
international law.
Subsequent practice has approved the usage of these treaties
as part of the definition of crime. The most important example is
the acceptance by the States Parties to the Rome Statute of
"serious violations" of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions as war crimes75 because there had been questions
raised whether these were truly crimes under customary
international law.76
Another example of subsequent international practice
accepting this pattern is the Statute of the SCSL, negotiated
between the UN and the state of Sierra Leone. That treaty,
negotiated after the application of Common Article 3 in the ICTY
and ICTR, explicitly placed violations of Common Article 3 as
crimes within the jurisdiction of the SCSL. 77
The structure of the Rome Statute continues this practice of
interpreting and applying other treaties as defining crimes as well.
The Rome Statute directly incorporates "grave breaches" of the
1949 Geneva Conventions as war crimes in international armed
conflict,78 as well as violations of Common Article 3 in noninternational armed conflict.79 Some crimes are defined in the
same terms as prohibited acts set out in other treaties, such as the
Genocide Convention.8 0

75. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 8(2)(c).
76. Note, however, the Rome Statute generally applies only prospectively to
persons with a relevant relationship to a State Party. With regard to such
persons, these provisions could be applied (without violating the principle of
legality) even if there had not been a complete consensus that they were
customary as of the adoption of the Statute in 1998. The status of a provision
as customary international law can create an issue of legality only when a
Security Council referral is made involving a state not party to the Rome
Statute or when a retroactive acceptance of jurisdiction by such a state is
made. Rome Statute, supra note 18, arts. 12(3), 13(b).
77. Statute for the Special Court of Sierra Leone art. 3, S.C. Res. 1315,
U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Aug. 14, 2000) [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
78. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 8(2)(a).
79. Id. art. 8(2)(c).
80. Id. art. 6.
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C. The InternationalLegal Personalityof the ICC and
InternationalCriminalTribunals
These materials show the growth of the international legal
personality of international organizations-at least some
international organizations-over the last half-century. The
concept of "international legal personality" is not as definite, nor
as functionally oriented, as the concept of, say, "statehood."
Statehood-the primary example of international legal
personality-imports a relatively clear set of rights and duties that
apply to an entity in the international legal system. The
attribution of international legal personality to an entity means
that it has some rights or responsibilities-or some authority to
act (or perhaps to be acted upon)-in the international legal
system. It does not, however, specify what those rights and duties
are. Rather, it is an attribution created specifically to allow for the
identification of different categories of entity with different rights
and duties within the system.
The modern doctrine of "international legal personality"
began with the ICJ Advisory Opinion in the Reparations case.81
This case held that the UN, as an international organization, was
able to make international claims on its own behalf and on behalf
of the family of a person who had been killed while working for it,
against a state that was not then a UN member. Both of these
types of claims had traditionally been made in the modern 82
international legal system only by states. That is, in the tradition,
only states could make claims in the international legal system on
other states, and only the state of an individual's nationality (or
perhaps another state with a close relation to the matter) could
represent an individual's interest diplomatically against another
state. In this case, however, international legal personality
attached only to the UN as an international organization and not
to the individual victim, Count Bernadotte, or his family.
Importantly, this advisory opinion was actually obeyed both by the
UN and by the non-UN state involved. Israel (the state) and the
UN negotiated a resolution in which Israel recognized its failure to
protect Count Bernadotte and paid reparations to the UN for
losses to both the UN and the dead man's family.
The cases and other actions discussed here assert different
authority and responsibility-a different aspect of international
legal personality-on behalf of the international criminal courts
and tribunals. They assert the authority to declare and apply
international criminal law, and by necessity, international
humanitarian law, which is the root of this criminal law. They also
81. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 ICJ 174 (Apr. 11).
82. That is, Westphalian.
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assert the authority to declare international human rights law
concerning as it applies to criminal law and procedure. These
applications may in fact be part of the making of new law as we
have seen above.
III.

Do THESE CHANGES REFLECT AND CONTRIBUTE TO
GROWTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF
INDIVIDUALS?

Now it is time to take up the issues of inhering in the
statement of Professor Clark that accused persons have always
had the right to raise defenses in international criminal courts and
tribunals. 83 These issues closely connect to the way international
criminal courts and tribunals operate as international
organizations or organs of international organizations. The
international organization practice discussed in part II above falls
into two basic types of acts. The first is the more traditional
pattern of acts that have political, policy making, or policy
implementation goals. These acts include the Security Council's
establishment of the ICTY and ICTR.
The second type of act is the judgment or decision of an
international criminal tribunal made in the course of litigation.
This is what is relevant to the international legal personality of
individuals.
To oversimplify matters a bit, individuals and other non-state
actors were traditionally considered "objects" of international law;
states were effectively the sole "subjects." Individuals did not have
rights directly under any form of international law. Rather, states
had rights that they could enforce on behalf of their nationals by
making claims against other states. Treaties did not directly give
individuals rights, but again the state could make claims under
them that would benefit individuals who were their nationals.
This was the attitude at the beginning of the main
Nuremberg Trial. At the beginning of the proceeding against
them, the accused Major War Criminals at Nuremberg filed a
motion claiming that the Crimes against Peace set forth in the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal were defined ex
post facto-that is, defined only after the defendants had
84
committed their allegedly criminal acts. As the trial began, the
Tribunal rejected the motion stating, "insofar as it may be a plea
to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, it conflicts with Article 3 of the
85
The Tribunal never
Charter and will not be entertained."
83. See Clark, supra note 2 (stating that that the accused in every
international criminal tribunal have raised substantive law defenses).
84. Motion Adopted by All Defense Counsel, 19 November 1945, 1
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
168-170 (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947).
85. Oral Decision, 21 November 1945, 2 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
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precisely repudiated this view. Yet in its famous judgment at the
end of the trial, the Tribunal decided to write, at some length, on
the validity of its formation, on the authority of its creators to set
forth the law applying to the defendants, on its jurisdiction, and on
the alleged ex post facto nature of the crime of aggression.8 6
Moreover, much of the judgment deals with defenses raised by the
accused to the substance of the accusations, without any sense
that these need not, or should not be addressed. Finally, the whole
point of the Nuremberg exercise was to ensure that individuals
had duties, and criminal responsibility, directly under
international law for crimes defined by international law.
The history of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, described in Part
II above, continues this development. From the Tadic Appeal
decision onward, it is clear that individuals accused of crimes have
the right to challenge the jurisdiction of international criminal
tribunals and alleged violation of the principle of legality.87 They
have the right to challenge the substantive law definition of crimes
and modes of criminal responsibility8 8 and application of the law to
the facts. They have the right to raise substantive defenses to
crimes, on both the facts and the law. They have the authority to
claim procedural rights, such as the right to appeal.89 The judges
of these courts have the duty to respond to these claims of accused
persons or persons under investigation, and to accept claims
properly grounded in the law and the facts and also properly
brought under court procedures.
There is no doubt, in other words, that there is a right under
customary international law to present a defense on the law and
facts in international criminal tribunals. International criminal
tribunals as international organizations (or organs thereof) are
bound to respect customary international human rights law when
asserted by the accused or suspects. This is in the Rome Statute as
treaty law and the organic law of the Court as an international
TRIBUNAL,

TRIAL

OF

THE

MAJOR

WAR

CRIMINALS

95

(Nuremberg:

International Military Tribunal, 1947).
86. Id. 218ff.
87. Proscutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command
Responsibility,
10-36 (July 16, 2003) [hereinafter Hadzihasanovic];
Akayesu, supra note 74, 1 611-17; Prosecutorv. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR96-15-T, Decision on Defence Motion on Jurisdiction (June 18, 1997); Norman,
supra note 38.
88. See, e.g., Hadzihasanovic,supra note 87,
10-36 (on right to challenge
definition of command responsibility); Cambodia Decision on Joint Criminal
Enterprise, supra note 19 (same as to so-called "joint criminal enterprise"
responsibility").
89. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic (Appeal of Vujin), Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77,
Appeal Judgment on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel, Milan
Vujin, 3 (Feb. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Tadic/Vujin] (person convicted of
contempt could claim right to appeal).
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organization.9 0
Everything said above about proceedings in the international
criminal courts and tribunals would be absolutely familiar to
national lawyers. No criminal lawyer would be surprised at any of
this. Indeed such a lawyer would be shocked if the ability to make
such challenges were denied in criminal cases in any national
court.
Yet in the international criminal courts and tribunals, there
is a key difference. The claims made, both by the prosecution and
the defense, on the definitions of crimes, defenses to crimes,
criminal procedure guarantees, and so on, are made directly under
international law, to an international body.9 1 The international
criminal courts and tribunals have the duty to respond to these
conflicting claims of prosecution and defense and apply the facts as
the judges find them to international law. The judgments given
are binding and may result in enforcement of rights in favor of
individuals, or (upon conviction) penalization for violations of
duties.
Indeed, states cannot even object as a matter of right to most
of the claims raised by the accused to an international criminal
court or tribunal. They are claims raised by individuals against
prosecutors who directly represent the international community,
or other entity which has created the court. States can only object
directly to individuals' claims where the state itself has an interest
in the claims (as where the accused or a victim requests
documents that a State claims are protected by national security
interests); states may have the status of amicus curiae to give
"observations" as to other issues, but this status is discretionary
with the court.92 This is, in a limited area of the law, a remarkable
reversal of the role of states and individuals in international law.
The role of the individual here begins to look a bit like the
role of the UN in the Reparations case; 93 that is, the individual is
an international legal person to the extent of being directly
responsible for violations of international criminal law. The
individual also has the right to make claims in defense of these
charges, both substantively and procedurally.
90. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 21(3).
91. There are a few cases even in these tribunals where national law may
apply, as in the use of some national criminal law in the SCSL Statute.
92. A state may, of course, object where an order binds it to do an act, such
as provide information to the relevant international court or tribunal. Cf.
Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 72 (protection of states' national security
information). They may also give an "observation" as amici curiae. Cf.
International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 103(1),
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000) (state may seek amicus status to
make observation).
93. See supra Part II.C (analyzing the Reparations case and the
international legal personality of the ICC and ICTs).
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However, in a criminal case, both prosecution and defense
have the right to have their claims adjudicated by the court. In the
Reparations case, the ICJ only gave its Advisory Opinion that the
UN had the authority to make international claims and to be
subject to international claims. It did not claim jurisdiction to
decide the merits of the dispute between the UN and Israel
concerning responsibility and liability for the death of Count
Bernadotte. By contrast, the international criminal courts and
tribunals have the duty to make the substantive decisions and give
judgment in criminal cases.
The individual suspect or accused, in other words, has a right
to demand that a decision be made on his or her claims. In this
way, the individual has a greater personality in the criminal
system than in the system of the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
There, the individual may have the right to make claims to the
Human Rights Committee against a state that has adopted the
Protocol. The opinions rendered by the Committee, however, do
not bind states to follow them.
The source of the claims of right varies in international
criminal courts. Many are based specifically in the organic
documents of the relevant tribunal, as where the Statutes of the
ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC contain procedural rights of
suspects and the accused. 94 Others are based in customary
international human rights law, as where the right to appeal was
adjudged a customary international law right.95
Two provisions of the Rome Statute suggest a new (or at least
revised) source of international human rights law that individuals
can claim-generally accepted human rights treaties to which the
ICC as an international organization is not a party. The first
example is the general human rights provision of Article 21(3):
The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article
must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights,
and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as
gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour,
language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national,
94. Rome Statute, supra note 18, arts. 57, 67; ICTY Statute, supra note 18,
arts. 18, 21; ICTR Statute, supra note 18, arts. 17, 20. For analogous
provisions, compare International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art.
14, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 16, 1966).
98, 100, 104 (finding right to appeal
95. See Aleksovski, supra note 20,

part of fair trial "requirement of customary international law"); see also
Tadic/Vujin, supra note 89, at p. 3 (right to appeal criminal conviction and

sentence is an "imperative norm of international law to which the tribunal
must adhere," relying on International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 14(5) and Secretary-General's Report of May 3, 1993, S/25704 (ICTY
Statute and Rules must be interpreted to respect "internationally recognized
standards regarding the rights of the accused")).
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96
ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.

This provision at least binds the ICC to apply customary
international human rights law to individuals and other private
entities in investigation, prosecution, substantive law of crime,
and defenses and sentencing.9 7 The language of the provision is
not specifically limited to custom, however. The Court could
conceivably choose to interpret "internationally recognized human
rights" to include general principles of law, and possibly widely
recognized treaties (such as provisions of the ICCPR), in matters
where such rights would be applicable, even if they have not yet
become customary international law rights.98 This would have the
interesting effect of applying ICCPR treaty rights to an
international organization which could not become a party to the
treaty because it is not a state.
The second example explicitly uses the technique of applying
treaty law to the ICC, even though it is not a party to the relevant
treaties. In "exercising its discretion" where sentenced persons
may be sent for imprisonment, the Court
shall take into account the following;
(b) the application of widely accepted international treaty standards
governing the treatment of prisoners;
(c) the views of the sentenced person; .... 99
The phrase "widely accepted international treaty standards"
indicates that sentenced persons are entitled to protections beyond
those provided by customary international law. It is not clear
whether any such "widely accepted international treaty standards"
are minimal standards of treatment that bind the Court in all
cases. This is listed as one of several factors that guide the Court's
discretion. However, the fact that the sentenced person has the
right to give views shows that such persons may bring this issue
before the Court.
It seems a bit ironic, though. Many of the accused in
international criminal courts have committed the worst of acts.
Yet they are among the first to be able to bring international
claims as a matter of right on their own behalves on the

96. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 21(3).
97. See generally Kenneth S. Gallant, Individual Human Rights in a New
International Organization: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 3 INT'L CRIMINAL L. 693-722 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational

Publishers 2d ed. 1999) (providing analysis of the stated proposition).

98. While there is much commentary that suggests that the entire ICCPR

has passed into customary international law, it is more accurate to examine
each provision of the treaty to determine whether it has done so.
99. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 103(3).
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international plane.
The Rome Statute begins to broaden this right to bring
international claims on the international plane to victims of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.100 Victims are not truly
parties to the proceedings in the ICC-party status remains
limited to the prosecution and the accused. However, they do have
certain rights of participation in the proceedings, the outlines of
which are being developed by the jurisprudence of the Court.10
These rights of participation along with restitution as a part of the
sentence that may be imposed on a convicted person 102 will likely
lead to at least one narrow situation where victims of core
international crime will be able to raise claims of right in the ICC
and to receive an adjudication of those claims. Thus, they too
appear to be on the road to an "international legal personality,"
albeit a strictly limited one. For example, it does not appear that
victims will have an internationallaw right to enforce restitution
payments in the courts of states where property of sentenced
persons is located; this may need to be done through the
mechanisms of the ICC.103
In sum, individuals are now "law claimers" as of right in the
system of international criminal law and procedure. The original
creation of international criminal liability, along with its
enforcement by courts or tribunals that are international organs,
has led to a limited system in which individuals have enforceable
rights as well as duties directly under international law. Whether
individual acts will ever become constitutive of international law,
as international organization acts have, remains to be seen.104
That is, individuals are not yet "law makers" even in the
international criminal law system.

100. Id. arts. 5-21.
101. Id. arts. 68, 75(3), discussed in Situation in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of the
proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial
Chamber I of December 7, 2007 and in the appeals of the OPCD and the
Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of December 24, 2007,
ICC 01/04-556 (Dec. 19, 2008).
102. Rome Statute, supra note 18, arts. 77-80.
103. Id. art. 109.
104. By contrast, Professor Jordan Paust, in discussion at the Symposium,
suggested that acts of individuals are generally relevant to the creation of
international law. Jordan Paust, Mike and Teresa Baker Law Center
Professor of International Law at the Law Center of the University of
Houston, Panel Discussion at The John Marshall Law Review Symposium:
International Justice in the 21st Century: The Law & Politics of the
International Criminal Court (Apr. 23, 2010); Cf. CUSTOMARY IHL, supra note
31 (refusing to take a position on whether status of acts of anti-government
insurgent groups are acts that contribute to the international humanitarian
law of internal armed conflict).
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IV. How MIGHT THE TRENDS DISCUSSED HERE DEVELOP IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW GENERALLY?

International criminal law, and the related areas of
international human rights law (including but not limited to
human rights in criminal law and procedure) and international
humanitarian law, may be the most obvious fields of international
law where the changes discussed above are occurring. However,
international organizations are taking on a binding judicial or
quasi-judicial role in many other areas of law, such as the Law of
the Sea (Tribunal for the Law of the Sea under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea) and international trade (World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Mechanism, North
American Free Trade Agreement Dispute Settlement Mechanism).
The role of private interests is also developing. In the time and
space allotted here, we can only discuss a few examples of
developing trends.

A. InternationalOrganizations
The trend toward acknowledgement of judicial decisions,
especially international judicial decisions, as "non-subsidiary"
points of practice is expanding beyond the area of international
criminal law. Specifically, there is evidence that, within a judicial
or quasi-judicial system, prior decisions of appeals bodies bind
subsidiary bodies on matters of law. Moreover, there is use of
decisions across lines of subject matter jurisdiction. There is also
use of decisions between bodies with jurisdiction over different
types of "international persons" such as states, individuals, and
international organizations.
One remarkable decision comes from the World Trade
Organization Appeals Body. Its report in United States-Final

Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, decided
that first-instance Panels should generally follow rules of law
articulated by Appeals Panels in prior matters, citing both
Aleksovski and a decision from the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).10 5 It found this
necessary to "ensuring 'security and stability' in the dispute
settlement system."106 This decision was accepted as final by the

105. Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Anti-Dumping Measures
on Stainless Steel from Mexico, T 145-62, n.313, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30,
2008) [hereinafter Stainless Steel]. Interestingly, the party in that case
arguing that a WTO Panel violated the Dispute Resolution Understanding by
failing to apply prior Appellate Body rulings was Mexico, a civil law country,
supported by the European Communities (largely civil law, except for Great
Britain and Ireland), Thailand, and Japan. The United States, a common law
country, supported the right of Panels to consider but ultimately disregard
prior Appeals Body rulings, even in related matters.
106. Id. T 160, n.313, citing Aleksovski, supra note 20; See Saipem S.p.A. v.
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WTO Dispute Settlement Body (that is, it was not rejected by
consensus).107

This decision by the Appellate Body of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body is fascinating for a number of reasons. Several
reasons appear directly from its reliance on Aleksovski and the
ICSID decision.
First, international
decisionmakers are relying on
international judicial and quasi-judicial decisions as instances of
practice despite the fact that international status of the parties in
the cases they rely on are clearly distinguishable from those the
case they are reviewing. In the Stainless Steel case matter, the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body dealt, as it generally does, with
disputes between states.1 08 Yet here, it accepts as relevant practice
from bodies with very different mandates. This practice is relevant
to the Dispute Settlement Body's interpretation of its judging
process under its own constituent agreements, the WTO
Agreement and the WTO Dispute Resolution Understanding. Yet
one case relied on, Aleksovski, is from the ICTY, which judges
criminal cases in which a public Prosecutor empowered by the UN
brings charges against individuals under customary international
law.109 The other case, the ICSID decision in Saipem S.p.A., is
from an arbitral tribunal that, like the international criminal
courts, deals with disputes between public and private entities.110
ICSID Tribunals deal with disputes between states and "natural"
or "juridical" persons when submitted to ICSID by consent of the
parties."'l Its substantive law sources are cosmopolitan, based first

in agreement of the parties, and then in national law and both
Bangl., Case No. ARB/05/07, 1 67 (ICSID Arb. Tr., Mar. 21, 2007) (footnotes
omitted) [hereinafter Sipem S.p.A.]:
The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the
same time, it is of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to
earlier decisions of international tribunals. It believes that, subject to
compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established
in a series of consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to the
specifies of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it
has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of
investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the
community of States and investors towards certainty of the rule of law.
107. World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Understanding art.
17(14), available at http://www.wto.org/english/traptop-e/dispu-e/dsue.htm#
17.
108. In some instances, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body may deal with
entities such as Hong Kong or the European Union, which have special status
in WTO law, but essentially play a role analogous to states in the WTO
system.
109. See supra Part III (analyzing whether recent changes reflect and
contribute to growth in the international legal personality of individuals).
110. Saipem S.p.A., supra note 106.
111. ICSID Convention art. 25, availableat http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSI
D/StaticFiles/basicdoclCRREnglish-final.pdf.
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public and private international law:
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of
law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such
agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting
State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws)
and such rules of international law as may be applicable.112
International organizations exercising judicial and quasijudicial functions are now part of the international lawmaking
process. They may exercise their power solely concerning disputing
states, or have direct power over private parties, or indeed (as with
the ICC and international criminal tribunalss) they may exercise a
prosecutorial function-punishing crimes against the international
community as a whole. They may decide about applicable
customary international law, applicable treaties and conventions,
or applicable general principles of law. The claims of private
parties in the tribunals with jurisdiction over them result in
judgments which become part of the practice which constitutes
international law.
Second, in the Stainless Steel case, the Appellate Body
recognizes that there are other, so-called "exclusive" authorities for
interpretations of the WTO Agreement that bind states. These are
the Council of Ministers and the General Council of the WTO, both
of which have representatives of every member state.113 Yet under
Stainless Steel, an Appellate Body ruling of law interpreting the
WTO Agreement that has been accepted by the Dispute
Settlement Body appears to be authoritative, until either of those
organs acts, preferably by a consensus but at least by a 3/4 vote. 114
Presumably, the political decision of one of the Councils to adopt a
different interpretation would "overrule" the DSB interpretation
because if the Council interpretations bind states, surely they bind
the Dispute Settlement Bony and its bodies in interpreting the
rights and duties of states in conflict. Yet even when the Councils
act, the rule of non-unanimity demonstrates that it is the
international organization that is legislating an interpretation, not
the states (at least in all cases) merely coming to an agreement.
Third is the reference to the ICSID case. In the cited case,
the ICSID arbitral panel stated that "it must pay due
consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals."115
112. Id. art. 42(1); see also id. art. 42(2) (prohibiting a decision of non liquet).
113. Stainless Steel, supra note 105, 1 158, n.308, relying on World Trade
Organization Agreement art. IX(2), available at http://www.wto.org/englishl
docs ellegal e/04-wtoe.htm [hereinafter WTO Agreement], which states in
part, "The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the
exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the
Multilateral Trade Agreements . . . ."

114. WTO Agreement, supra note 113, art. IX(1)(2).
115. Saipem S.p.A., supra note 106.
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This suggests a requirement that relevant decisions of other
international tribunals-regardless of which tribunals they arebe considered practice under the relevant source of international
law. It certainly does not suggest these sources are subsidiary.
This aspect of ICSID practice, however, must be viewed with
caution because ICSID is more like a set of arbitration panels than
a unified permanent court, and because the panels may not always
have consistently applied rulings of prior panels.
Last is the reaction of some relevant states to the WTO
Appeals Body decision. The majority of states discussing the
matter in the Dispute Resolution Body reacted favorably to the
decision that Panels should follow prior Appellate Body
determinations on points of law.116 The United States disagreed:
This Report purported to create a new legal effect for Appellate
Body reports, one that would appear to grant to the Appellate Body
the very authority to issue authoritative interpretations of the
covered agreements that was reserved by the WTO Agreement
exclusively to Members.1 17
Yet the United States had a tightrope to walk. It did not want
to give Panels complete freedom to ignore prior Appellate Body
decisions. The ambivalence of its position is quite clear in the
following paragraph:
The United States did, of course, share the Appellate Body's interest
in having similar cases treated similarly. The United States
expected that all Members would do likewise. The United States did

not, however, share this Report's view that this meant that panels
must follow Appellate Body reports in different disputes. Rather, to
cite again the "Japan-Alcoholic Beverages" Appellate Body Report,
the United States would expect any panel to take account of any
other relevant adopted report, whether authored by the Appellate
Body or by a different panel. To take account of an adopted report, of
course, did not mean to follow it without hesitation.
To the
contrary, to take account of such a report meant to examine it, to

consider it, and to engage with its reasoning. The United States
recalled that an objective assessment was one that was critical and
searching. Such an assessment could lead, in fact, to further or

greater clarification.1 18

So, in the end, even the United States accepted the notion
that prior Appellate Body decisions should be treated as relevant
treaty practice for purposes of interpreting the WTO Agreement.
Not surprisingly, the states commenting on this issue divided
on the basis of their view of the merits of the case, and readers
may draw their own conclusions from this.
116. World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement Body Minutes of
Meeting, May 20, 2008, WT/DSB/M/250 (2008).
117. Id.
118. Id.

48.
54.
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These developments pose interesting challenges to the
"principal judicial organ" of the UN, the ICJ.119 The new multitribunal, more specialized international judiciary and its
participation in the lawmaking function threatens to diminish the
importance of the ICJ in some areas of international law.
These developments also challenge the dominance of Article
38 of the ICJ Statute as the most accurate model for describing the
sources of international law. This article has essentially persisted
from the time of its predecessor, the Statute of the League of
Nations' Permanent Court of International Justice. 120 The ICJ
must apply its own Statute, and states may continue choosing to
have disputes resolved by that Court. The use of political or
executive acts of international organizations as practice that goes
to the formation or demonstration of international custom does not
violate the plain text of the ICJ Statute. Article 38 does not limit
to states the entities whose practice may be considered. 121
The ICJ does face two conundrums with regard to the use and
limitations of international judicial decisions. First, international
custom is now partially constituted by the practice of international
tribunals. Thus, consideration of such custom under Article 38
must include consideration of these decisions as non-subsidiary
instances of practice. Second, the Court needs to face up openly to
the fact that its own decisions have become part of the practice
constituting custom. A strong reading of Article 59-giving no
effect whatsoever to prior practice of the ICJ in subsequent
decisions-has never been the practice of the Court. Such a
reading is now wholly untenable.
This Article considers only two aspects of the participation of
international organizations, along with states, in the creation of
international law: first, in the creation of international custom
and, second, in treaty interpretation. It does not address one of the
stronger claims concerning the role of international organizations
in the making of international law. Professor Krzysztof
Skubiszewski has called rules of law made by international
organizations "a fourth (and new) category of rules of international
law[,] .

.

. distinct from customary rules, treaty rules and general

principles of law . . ."122 Whether this is true or not can be left for
another day.
One thing is very likely though: as the number of
international organizations grows, along with their powers
(including especially judicial or quasi-judicial authority), the
119. U.N. Charter art. 92.
120. Permanent Court of International Justice Statute art. 38. The fate of
this Court makes the author nervous about congratulatory references to the
ICC as the world's first "permanent" international criminal court.
121. ICJ Statute, supra note 1, art. 38(1)(b).
122. Skubiszewski, supra note 11, at 365.
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importance of international organizations in the development of
customary international law and the interpretation of treaties will
grow as well.
B. Individuals and PrivateInterests
The right of individuals and other private entities to raise
claims internationally is being consolidated. This development is
intimately connected with the growth in the lawmaking function of
international organizations as exercised by their judicial and
quasi-judicial organs.
These rights of individuals are granted in one of two ways.
The first is by treaty or international agreement. Such treaties
include the Rome Statute of the ICC, the regional human rights
treaties establishing regional human rights courts that allow
individuals to make human rights claims under regional treaty
law against states, 123 the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, the agreement between Sierra Leone and the UN to
establish the SCSL, or the London Agreement to establish the
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg).
The second is by the operative act of an international
organization acting within its mandate, such as the creation of the
ICTY and ICTR by the Security Council pursuant to its obligation
to restore and maintain international peace and security. Other
tribunals that largely deal with how internal law of international
organizations affects individuals and private interests include the
UN Administrative Tribunal and the new UN Dispute Tribunal.
This new international legal personality of individuals
remains strictly limited. It exists only where recognized by the
relevant international actors, whether states (through treaties) or
international organizations (through treaties or operative acts).
The materials presented here cannot be stretched to make a claim
that individuals have a general right in all cases to make
international law claims directly against states, or that such a
right is likely to develop soon. Moreover, in the tribunals discussed
in this Article, individuals and other private persons remain
strictly law claimers, and not law makers.
Thus, the continued growth of the individual legal personality
of the natural and juridical persons seems likely to be "horizontal."
It is quite likely that they may become law claimers in an
increasing number of international judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies, covering a broadening range of subject matters. It is
123. European Convention on Human Rights and Protocols (establishing
European Court of Human Rights); American Convention on Human Rights
(establishing Inter-American Court of Human Rights); African Charter on
Human and Peoples Rights and Protocol (establishing the African Court of
Human and Peoples Rights).
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unlikely that the role of the individual in international law will be
cut back in the foreseeable future.
V. CONCLUSION

One new reality demonstrated here-that is, the inclusion of
acts of international organizations as international lawmaking
practice and the non-subsidiary nature of international judicial
and quasi-judicial decisions-should even now be reflected in
doctrine. As mentioned above, 124 it throws into doubt the reliance
on Article 38 as the exclusive model for sources of international
law and the place of international adjudication in the making of
international law. It certainly rejects, outside the direct ICJ
context, the subsidiary nature of international judicial decisions. It
indicates that national judicial decisions may be considered as
state practice, along with state-to-state diplomatic interactions, in
appropriate cases.
The role of international judicial and quasi-judicial organs in
treaty interpretation varies. Where interpreting their own
constituent treaties in cases within their judicial competence, their
decisions may be authoritative or nearly so. These may include
decisions where an individual has raised a claim based directly on
the treaty in the Court-that is, individuals may in some cases be
able to force an authoritative interpretation. Yet even where a
court makes an adjudication concerning interpretation of a treaty
to which it is not a party, such a decision may be considered as
subsequent practice for further interpretation.
The new reality also means that Judge Manley 0. Hudson's
famous formulation of custom, which exclusively considers the
practice of states, must be revised. A minimal revision of his
doctrine, responding only to the changes discussed in this Article,
and preserving his intellectual framework, might read:
The emergence of a principle or rule of customary international law
would seem to require presence of the following elements:
(a) concordant practice by a number of States or International
Organizations, including their judicial or quasi-judicial organs,
acting within their authority with reference to the type of situation

falling within the domain of international relations:
(b) continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable
length of time;
(c) conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with
prevailing international law; and
(d) general acquiescence in the practice by other States and relevant
InternationalOrganizations.

124. See supra Part IVA (analyzing international organizations as they
affect international law generally).
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The judicial and quasi-judicial organs referred to above include
those in which individuals, other private entities, and organs of
international organizations may raise and receive binding
adjudication of claims under internationalor other relevant law, as
well as those in which states may be the sole parties in contentious
cases. 125

125. Modified with great respect from Hudson, supra note 8, $ 11 (additions
in italics). This version deals only with criticisms of Hudson's definition raised
in this Article, and not with the many other issues that could be argued
concerning it.

